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Abstract With geometrically growing demand and a realization
of muddied supply management and source limitation, the
conceptualization of water and its corresponding allocation are
changing on global, national, state, and local scales. Allocation
is shifting from traditionally institutionally-favored water users
(e.g. agricultural and hydro-power industries) to more wealthy
urban centers through interbasin transfers and to environmental
flow restoration for threatened or endangered species. The
state of South Carolina is beginning to realize the actual cost of
minimal water policy on interstate watercourses in its
relationships with its neighboring states (North Carolina and
Georgia) and to act accordingly. In a potentially precedentsetting action in June 2007, South Carolina brought suit in the
U.S. Supreme Court against the state of North Carolina over the
approved interbasin transfer of 13 million gallons per day from
the Catawba River to two North Carolina cities in the YadkinPee Dee River basin.
This research examines the progression of the lawsuit to date,
using the South Carolina v. North Carolina pleadings, other
legal research and primary and secondary historical documents
to compare the proceedings under the assigned special master
with those of the events in the seminal Colorado River lawsuit,
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d
542 (1963). The findings reveal that although most of the
decisive water law precedent originates in the arid West, the
present suit has the potential to change that disparity and set a
new course in eastern water law. Additionally, the implications
and legacies of the Arizona v. California (1963) holding have
import and bearing on South Carolina’s legal strategies and
ultimate water policy and planning objectives (e.g.
accommodating anticipated shifts in water users and future
economic development).
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court’s (USSC) seminal holding in
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d
542 (1963) was one of the most protracted water battles in the
Western U.S. and has been dubbed ―the Case of the Century.‖
It represents the David and Goliath story in water law, with a

small state challenging and prevailing over the largest waterconsuming state on the lower portion of the largest western
river, the Colorado. Native American intervenors ultimately
reaped the greatest benefit from the holding, garnering one fifth
of Arizona’s share (Reisner 1993; Sax et al. 2006; Getches
1997).
Although the Catawba River, originating in the North Carolina
(NC) mountains and extending through South Carolina’s (SC)
sandhills region, is nowhere near the volume or majesty of the
Colorado, its flows are the source of what may be the next
―Case of the Century.‖ They provide hydroelectric power,
economic development, recreation, and drinking water for both
states. Like the state of Arizona, SC challenged its neighboring
state’s approval of an interbasin transfer of 13 million gallons
per day from the Catawba River to two NC cities in the
Yadkin-Pee Dee River basin. It filed a parens patriae suit
against the state of NC in the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2007
alleging harm and seeking relief through equitable
apportionment. The repercussions of the eventual holding are
projected to ripple throughout other large riparian systems,
including the Savannah River. Given this potential, South
Carolina v. North Carolina warrants comparison with Arizona
v. California (1963), despite eastern equitable apportionment
precedent in New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (Sax
et al. 2006).
Background and Related Work
There have been numerous accounts about the Arizona v.
California (1963) case, including the events precipitating the
filing (Hundley 2001; August 2007), the actual 11-year battle
(August 2007), and the aftermath of the holding (Reisner 1993).
As late as 2006, over 40 years after the holding, the USSC
issued another binding decree (Arizona v. California, 547 U.S.
150 (2006)). But the focus for this work involves the actual
facts and legal strategies used in the case.
AZ’s initial arguments were based on water rights between the
states, and they faced the problem of California’s perfected
prior appropriation being put to beneficial use. The law was

recognized in all states that were party to the Colorado
Compact. But a change in legal counsel in the spring of 1957
caused the argument to shift. Instead of contending with water
rights, AZ invoked the supremacy of a federal statutory
allocation through the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1922.
And they ultimately prevailed, as the USSC agreed that the Act
controlled the mainstream of the Colorado.
In contrast, the SC complaint involves NC interbasin transfers
and a state-initiated statutory form of regulated riparianism.
According to the SC complaint, NC adopted an interbasin
transfer statute in 1991 that regulates transfers over 2 million
gallons per day and established a review process for affected
parties in the watershed. Since 1991, NC has authorized
transfer of over 48 million gallons per day from the Catawba to
other in-state basins (South Carolina Brief in Support of Motion
for Leave to File Complaint 2007).
Despite the recommendation of an interstate commission to
wait six months, the North Carolina Environmental
Management Commission approved the most recent transfer in
January 2007 (South Carolina Brief in Support of Motion for
Leave to File Complaint 2007). Meanwhile, SC and NC were
purportedly attempting to compact on the river. But the
approval caused SC to forgo further compacting efforts and file
suit under Article III, § 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, which
allows the USSC to hear disputes between two or more states,
and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). SC sought an injunction on NC’s
interbasin transfers, an equitable apportionment of the Catawba
and appointment of a special master, and to enjoin NC from
any other transfers that violate the apportionment (South
Carolina Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File
Complaint 2007).
There are two main issues in the case; namely, whether NC’s
transfer statute is invalid because it allows NC to use more than
its equitable share of the Catawba River, causing downstream
user injury, and whether that injury should be remedied with
equitable apportionment and appointment of a special master.
SC argues that there is historic volume variability in the
Catawba’s natural flow as determined in the FERC re-licensing
process for Duke Energy and that it is subject to prolonged
droughts that have affected SC as the downstream user (e.g.
1998 – 2002 and the economic harm + inability to drink the
water from the Wateree’s high algal content). Through expert
opinion (e.g. supporting letters from hydrologists), NC’s Jan.
2007 approved transfer combined with earlier transfers (a
perfected claim through the NC transfer statute) exceed the
Catawba’s dependable flow.
SC also argues that federal common law trumps state statutes
(e.g. NC’s transfer statute) in resolving interstate river issues
(and is only asserting this on the Catawba River). So the NC
transfer statute is invalid for resolving an interstate river
dispute, particularly because the NC Environmental
Management Commission need only consider ―a number of
factors . . . in granting a permit, all of which on their face

pertain only to North Carolina’s interests.‖ (South Carolina
Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint, 6)
Consequently, SC argued that it is entitled to equitable
apportionment as a remedy, and NC should take action
consistent with the apportionment after the special master is
appointed (South Carolina Brief in Support of Motion for
Leave to File Complaint 2007).
NC filed a reply brief, the USSC accepted the case and
assigned the first female special master in the country, Kristin
Linsley Myles. The states are currently attempting to agree
upon a case management plan, after having concluded that
bifurcation and phased discovery is appropriate. The first
phase will involve whether SC can show harm, and if so, the
second phase will involve legal and factual issues regarding
equitable apportionment. The states are also arguing about the
scope of the pleadings, including the appropriate geographic
boundary and whether intervenors (the City of Charlotte, the
Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy) should
be permitted. Special master Myles granted them intervenor
status in May 2008.
Methodology
This is a comparative assessment of the factual and legal
circumstances of each case, in order to draw parallels and
introduce potential lessons for SC from AZ’s experience. To
do so, the author uses legal and historical research, examining
pleadings for the South Carolina v. North Carolina suit, the
holding(s) in the Arizona v. California (1963) suit, and other
primary and secondary historical sources, particularly on the
latter.
Findings
Despite geographic and climatic differences between eastern
and western states, there are several factual and legal parallels
that can be drawn in the two cases.
Factual Similarities
The primary one is the disparate power relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant. Both California (CA) and NC
are/were in stronger economic positions than the plaintiff states
in each case and were consistently more developed (legally,
physically, economically, etc.). Both also have/had an interest
in delaying the outcome, because each could continue to
consume during litigation (Hundley), watering thirsty Southern
California or the greater Charlotte metropolitan statistical area.
Arizona (AZ) and SC are somewhat similarly situated (despite
a larger GDP disparity between AZ and CA than between SC
and NC). They each sought to grow and/or reserve the
potential to do so for economic and social reasons. Neither had
an interest in delay, as AZ had already depleted its surface
water and was rapidly diminishing its groundwater aquifers in
the 1950s (Hundley 2001; Reisner 1993; August 2007; Sax et al

2006), and SC was experiencing economic and drinking water
effects from water reduction in the Wateree in 2006.
Legal Similarities
Legally, both AZ and SC face(d) daunting and somewhat
untenable legal hurdles, because SC asserted most of its harm
during times of drought, acknowledging adequate volumes
more generally on the river (despite the Catawba’s variability).
AZ was challenging a state that had perfected its appropriative
water rights to 5.3 million acre-feet a year, despite the Boulder
Canyon Project Act allocation of 4.4 (August 2007). Even if
AZ had wanted to use 900,000 acre-feet per year (so that they
would not lose the right under the rules of an appropriative
system), they had no infrastructure to transfer the allocation and
put it to beneficial use. Through a fortunate turn of events for
AZ, they switched argument course with new counsel (Mark
Wilmer) and preempted CA’s perfected appropriation with
Congressional apportionment through the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1922 (August 2007). Like CA, NC created a de
facto prior appropriation situation through the interbasin
transfer statute and associated approvals. Because the South
Carolina v. North Carolina suit hasn’t even reached discovery,
there are no other legal similarities.

which effectively apportioned the lower Colorado River. But
SC cannot invoke the same; the state is asking for equitable
apportionment, not showing harm from its violation. An
analogous argument to AZ is curtailed by the fact that the
Catawba has no compact, which would otherwise have
extended similar authority and allocation assurance to the
Congressional statutory allocation on the Colorado.
Adding to SC’s burden, the special master permitted all
intervenors early in the proceedings, including the City of
Charlotte, the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke
Energy (Order Granting Motions for Leave to Intervene 2008).
However, intervenors were only allowed later in the Arizona v.
California (1963) proceedings, and they were limited to
sovereign Native Americans.
Finally, there is a simple difference in the nature of the water
rights involved in each river system. The common property
nature of the riparian doctrine, even under a regulated riparian
structure, means that SC has a more substantial and equal legal
platform than AZ with CA’s perfected, priority-based
appropriative rights. In theory, an upstream riparian cannot
harm a downstream riparian, but that is changing with more
consumptive uses on riparian systems.

Differences

From AZ to SC: Lessons

The factual and legal differences between the positions of the
plaintiffs and defendants are equivalent, if not surpass their
similarities. However, the lessons from Arizona v. California
(1963) should still act as a guide for SC in its strategy and more
importantly, in the wake of the holding in AZ’s favor.

Although it is still quite early in the South Carolina v. North
Carolina suit, upon reading the filings to date, it is fair to
anticipate years of wrangling. NC estimated 10 years with
discovery after successful showing of harm in the bifurcation.
Like Arizona v. California (1963), such protracted cases exact a
toll on both sets of parties, as well as the special master
(Rifkind suffered a stress-induced heart attack in the midst of
that case (August 2007)).

Factual Differences
In terms of physical growth, AZ was superseding that which
has been experienced in SC, causing AZ’s reliance on water to
rapidly increase. As its cities grew, AZ suffered subsidence
from groundwater overdraft. SC’s growth is comparatively
minimal in the Catawba basin.
Unlike SC and NC, there had been a long and protracted fight
occurring between AZ and CA before AZ actually filed suit
(Hundley 2001; August 2007). Although SC has objected as a
downstream user affected by a proposed interbasin transfer,
there is no long-standing fight between the two states over
water.
Legal Differences
Legally, SC is relying on establishing the harm threshold and
then arguing for equitable apportionment. The case has been
bifurcated and this first hurdle must be passed before the
special master will consider the terms of the equitable
apportionment. In contrast, once the new counsel stepped in,
AZ no longer had to fight the water rights priority battle.
Instead, they had to assert their statutory apportionment of 2.8
million acre-feet per year and show harm from its withholding.
AZ’s argument was saved by the Boulder Canyon Project Act,

SC’s position might have been stronger if it had proverbially
―cleaned its own house‖ before engaging in the litigation.
While proposed S.428 was an attempt to allocate water and
protect environmental flows, it was also introduced during
drought and grandfathered all existing users—maintaining the
disputed status quo. Had SC carefully examined its own uses,
determined whether to permit surface water (aka regulated
riparianism) before the drought and adopted S.428 or similar
legislation protecting flows in addition to establishing the
permitting system, it might have a more equal position in
challenging NC. But until then, NC can argue that SC should
not ask it to change its consumptive behavior until SC has been
able to do so successfully itself.
As a legal strategy that differs from AZ’s position, SC should
have passed S.428 (or similar legislation) protecting
environmental flows. Then they might have argued in the
original complaint that NC’s water consumption and interbasin
transfers were interfering with reasonable environmental flow
levels, regardless of drought. Because NC is challenging actual
harm to SC based on their description of events during drought,
this strategy would have established stronger grounds for

proving harm. But the lack of legal development may actually
give SC an advantage.

This lawsuit has the potential to change the course of eastern
water law. Arguably, the stakes are as high here as in the
Arizona v. California (1963) suit because of the potential to
In another form of ―cleaning house,‖ SC would most definitely affect interbasin transfer statutes on shared watercourses
have benefitted from a compact. Had one been in place, SC
(particularly for growing urban consumers) and to affect the
could have invoked federal reservation and oversight like AZ,
course of the FERC re-licensing on contested in interstate water
instead of relying on riparianism. This begs the question
bodies. Finally, the environment may prove to be analogous to
whether both states actually exhausted their compacting efforts the Native American intervenors. This case, arguably
and whether they had an obligation to do so. And it suggests
precipitated by drought, should have arrived long ago for
that before the suit concludes, SC would benefit from entering a equitable apportionment, or better, a compact to avoid the suit
compact with Georgia (GA) over the Savannah River.
entirely. But North Carolina argued that even equitable
apportionment isn’t needed outside of drought, given the
However, SC may have been forced to bring suit somewhat
Catawba’s capacity. Of all of the legacies that can be
prematurely in order to prevent NC’s prescriptive right to the
transferred from Arizona v. California (1963) to this suit, the
water through the interbasin transfers. Statutorily, NC could be most important is the idea of holistic, basin-wide sustainable
close to establishing prescriptive rights to the Catawba and in
and equitable water management policies.
that sense, SC had an obligation to object. But these weren’t
grounds in the original motion.
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al. 2006).
Additionally, winning the lawsuit does not mean winning the
battle. AZ suffered in its construction of the water conveyance
system (the Central Arizona Project) thanks to CA’s subsequent
Congressional interference (Hundley 2001; Reisner 1993).
Water shortage was a reality, regardless of the legal outcome.
And the Native American intervenors ultimately benefitted the
most, receiving one-fifth of AZ’s allocation (Sax et al. 2006).
As Reisner intimated, after discussing the legal issues in the
case, ―The real issues had much more to do with nature and
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water for AZ after the suit, and potentially the same will occur
for SC.
But that begs the question of what SC is truly inviting with this
suit. It’s possible that they will see unsustainable economic
development enabled, as the state’s consumptive uses increase.
It’s also possible that a negative outcome for SC will then set a
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beneficiaries through the suit. In fact, the environment may be
the new winner, analogous to the Native American intervenors
in Arizona v. California (1963).
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